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PARTY CONGRESS: PROMISES AND 
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DEMOCRATIZATION AND CHINA'S NATIONAL 
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The thirteenth party congresses of the Chinese Communist 
Party (CCP) and the Kuomintang (KMT) were arguably the 
most important vantage points in contemporary Chinese political 
history. They symbolized an apex of reformist political currents 
in the People's Republic of China (PRC) on the mainland and 
the Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan, respectively. 1 The con-
gresses ushered in a period of unprecedented change and uncer-
tainty, hope and despair. Many analysts' earlier euphoria, 
however, gave way to sober reassessment, as each polity encoun-
tered tremendous challenges. In particular, the Tiananmen Mas-
sacre served as a rude awakening to the seemingly irresolvable 
tension between economic reform and political reform. 2 By con-
trast, Taiwan's further democratization has opened a Pandora's 
box of political "untouchables" such as national identity, sub-
ethnic conflict, and independence aspiration. 3 Many noteworthy 
developments are still unfolding, the implications of which are 
not yet clear to us. But as Thomas B. Gold suggests, "the status 
quo is not static,"4 these significant events necessitate our recon-
ceptualization of the political systems and the state-society rela-
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tionship within each polity, as well as the repercussions of these 
events on Mainland-Taiwan relations. 
An Epoch of Reform and Retrenchment 
This period began on an upbeat note. Both the CCP and the 
KMT held their epochal thirteenth national congresses. Since 
these two parties still enjoy predominant positions in their 
respective political systems, their party congresses should be a 
focus of attention. The policies and personnel decided on in the 
party congresses had far-reaching implications for each polity's 
future directions, as later events have borne out. 
To be sure, both Taiwan and the mainland had entered his-
torical crossroads. For Taiwan, the issue of political democrati-
zation looms large. After two decades of rapid economic growth, 
an affluent society is starting to demand more effective political 
participation-a phenomenon which seems to vindicate the 
mainstream modernization school. 5 The major events that pre-
cipitated the torrents of democratization included the birth of the 
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)6-the first meaningful 
opposition party, the lifting of the martial law, 7 the decontrol of 
foreign exchange, the lifting of the bans on the formation of polit-
ical parties (tang-chin) and the registration of new newspapers 
(pao-chin ), and the decision to allow Taiwan's citizens to visit 
their relatives on the mainland. These important changes, 
pushed primarily by the late President Chiang Ching-kuo in his 
final years, set the agenda of political reform. Lee Teng-hui, 
Chiang's successor and the first Taiwan native to become the 
ROC president, strived to implement and augment the reform 
programs. In addition to international acclaim and a sense of 
confidence and pride, these reforms introduced in Taiwan 
unprecedented political pluralism. On the one hand, the 
increased political pluralism poses a challenge to the KMT on 
how to maintain, deepen, and broaden its political base in an 
increasingly complex, dynamic, and differentiated society. On 
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the other hand, it also provides an opportunity for the party and 
the society to stride together toward a genuine democracy, a sys-
tem alien to Chinese history and culture but yearned for by mod-
em Chinese intellectuals since the May Fourth era. The 
confidence and pride consolidated in the experience of democrati-
zation in turn assures the people on Taiwan of the future viability 
of their system vis-a-vis the mainland in the aftermath of 
Chiang's death and "enlightened strong-man rule." 
For the PRC, economic reform has been the foremost priority 
on the national agenda. The campaign against "bourgeois liber-
alization" in early 1987 cast doubt over China's future course. 
Yet the reform-minded Chinese leadership curbed the possible 
harms caused by policy swings that characterized the revolution-
ary Maoist era. In the Thirteenth Party Congress, China's 
reformists, 8 through careful arrangements and skillful maneuver-
ing, set the stage for accelerating Deng Xiaoping (Teng Hsiao-
p'ing) and Zhao Ziyang's (Chao Tzu-yang) reform programs. No 
doubt, China is undergoing a fundamental change of its system, 
by uneasily incorporating elements of capitalism into the alleged 
socialist "core. " 9 No one is certain about the final results of this 
unprecedented venture-what Deng called "China's second 
revolution." But the success (or failure) of these proposals would 
have profound impact on the nature of the regime, and the main-
land's appeal to capitalist Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
Each polity's endogenous changes contribute to transforming 
its own system. Yet changes in either side also constitute certain 
exogenous stimuli for further changes and adjustments on the 
other side. They also alter the patterns of interaction between 
the two. Many "internal" moves of one side are being perceived 
by the other side as a signal to it, not to mention the more explicit 
"external" moves that specifically target it. 
This article stresses the interconnectedness between develop-
ments in the two systems. It will first discuss the backgrounds, 
results, and implications of each side's party congresses, because 
the congresses could be regarded as a focal point of the key devel-
opments in this period in each system. Their agendas, achieve-
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ments, and problems were indicative of the general trends and 
predictable obstacles that ensued. It will also show the different 
developmental orientations of the two sides: political democrati-
zation in Taiwan and economic reform in China. Then the broad 
factors resulting from these changes which may affect future 
mainland-Taiwan relations are identified and discussed. In con-
clusion, this paper offers an alternative perspective on the nature 
of the regimes of the two sides and the relationship between them 
in light of the changes these two have encountered. 
The CCP's Thirteenth National Congress: Achievements and 
Problems 
The CCP's Thirteenth National Congress was held at a his-
torical juncture with undue weight caused by some unexpected 
disruptions. The congress would have been important enough 
for the PRC to assess its reform programs implemented since 
1978 and to determine the priorities of its future reforms, had 
those series of events in winter 1986-1987 not happened. Clearly 
those events-large-scale student demonstrations demanding 
more freedoms, the abrupt dismissal of Hu Yaobang (Hu Yao-
pang) as the CCP General Secretary, the launching of the cam-
paign against "bourgeois liberalization," the purge of several 
prominent party intellectuals critical of the regime-added a 
sense of urgency in the prelude leading to the congress. Facing 
tremendous pressures from conservative senior leaders, Deng was 
ever more anxious to ensure an "orderly succession" after his 
death. As Huntington has observed, "the way of the reformer is 
hard," because he must implement reform measures quickly and 
with power against opposition from the conservatives. 10 Intense 
power struggles preceded the congress, yet it turned out that the 
reformers won an important victory. 
Achievements: Changing of the Guards and Ideological 
Refunctionalization 
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The major achievements of the congress can be analyzed 
along two dimensions: (1) personnel, and (2) policy. On the 
personnel dimension, virtually all the survivors of the Long 
March generation (with the notable exceptions of Deng and 
Yang Shangkun) 11 were either retired or moved to secondary 
positions. Replacing these old guards were younger people with 
professional expertise. No generational change had been so strik-
ing before in CCP history. 12 This symbolized a further retrench-
ment of the Maoist obsession with ideology and uninterrupted 
revolution. Instead, economics were back on the top. 13 The 
selection of Zhao, Li Peng, Hu Qili (Hu Ch'i-li), Qiao Shi (Ch'iao 
Shih), and Yao Yilin (Yao Yi-lin) to form the Standing Commit-
tee of the Politburo reflected a balance of forces and policy views 
among the top leadership. But in the Politburo and the Central 
Committee, on balance, the reformists had got the upper hand. 
China seemed to have recovered from the harms caused by Hu's 
removal. Many observers hailed that an "orderly succession" to 
Deng had reemerged; Zhao was clearly ticketed to become 
China's preeminent leader in the post-Deng era. 14 
On the policy dimension, Zhao's work report, which was 
accepted as an official document, contained three important ele-
ments.15 The first was the notion that China is currently in "the 
initial stage of socialism." During this period, which will last 
until the 2050s according to the theory, private ownership would 
be permitted to exist in order to improve productivity and eco-
nomic development, which are prerequisites to the ultimate 
socialist transformation. This formulation represented China's 
yet another attempt to refunctionalize16 its Marxist doctrines; it 
provided Chinese reformers a theoretical justification for their 
current and future reform measures. Second, Zhao's report reit-
erated China's long-term policy commitments to a market-domi-
nated economic system and the policy of opening to the outside 
world. Third, several temperate initiatives on political reform 
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(better termed "administrative reform") were enunciated: e.g., 
separation of party functions from government ones, improve-
ment of administrative efficiency, and establishment of a civil ser-
vice system. 
These proposals, taken together, confirm the assertion that 
economic reform has been, still is, and will probably still be in the 
near future, the paramount concern of the leadership and the 
overall direction of developments in China. And how to best 
implement economic reform without endangering the supremacy 
of the CCP amidst a "revolution of rising expectations" consti-
tutes a formidable task for the Chinese leadership. 
However, one could not claim the congress a total success. It 
left many tough and fundamental problems unsolved (maybe 
they never will or can be solved), which eventually paved the way 
to a systemic crisis represented by the Tiananmen incident. 
Problems: Pressures of Political Reform and Succession Crisis 
One way to gauge the viability of reforms is to test them 
against some immediate, intermediate, and long-term challenges. 
The more immediate problems include the difficult but necessary 
price reform (rationalization of the price system without creating 
runaway inflation), budget deficits, and trade imbalances. The 
intermediate problems concern the lack of infrastructure, the 
shortage of professional human resources, and the inefficiency 
and resistance of the bureaucratic system. The long-term issues 
are more fundamental: ( 1) the ability to manage an increasingly 
complex economy by a socialist state which was so used to cen-
tral planning, 17 (2) the "diminishing marginal returns" of ideo-
logical justifications, 18 and (3) the demand for democratization 
as people's living standard continues to rise, which will eventu-
ally call in question the party's legitimacy. 
But these structural obstacles seem rather abstract in light of 
the personalistic aspect of Chinese politics. Looking from histor-
ical hindsight, nothing seems more ironic than many scholars' 
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romanticization of "orderly transition." In fact, the anxiety to 
secure an "orderly transition" reflects a "succession dilemma" 
facing China's paramount leader (Mao and Deng alike) face: the 
more he fears chaos after his death, the more he wants to groom 
an heir apparent while he is alive; but if anything happens to this 
prince, his succession plan will be disrupted, and he will feel 
more insecure about his death. The fates of Mao's and Deng's 
hand-picked successors (e.g., Liu Shaoqi (Liu Shao-ch'i), Lin 
Biao (Lin Piao), Hua Guofeng (Hua Kuo-feng), Hu Yaobang, 
and most recently, Zhao Ziyang}-disgraced, tortured, jailed, or 
vanished-should attest to this claim. 19 The power triad erected 
since the Twelfth Congress in 1982-Hu in charge of party 
affairs, Zhao running the government, and Deng overseeing the 
military-is now distant history. Hu and Zhao in tum were 
scapegoats for power struggles. In the long run, the real solution 
to preventing post-strong man disorder is to institutionalize the 
succession process. Otherwise, the "succession crisis" will reoc-
cur. In fact, the Tiananmen crisis clearly demonstrated this. It is 
the causes and consequences of Tiananmen that we now tum to. 
Genesis, Consummation, and Repercussions of the Crisis 
The Tiananmen massacre came as a "surprise" to many aca-
demics and politicians, who had euphorically believed and 
claimed that China "had gone capitalist," and Western ties had 
irreversibly brought China into the community of nations. What 
was not so long ago a quite trendy subject gradually turned into a 
marginal and embarrassing one, in light of the end of the Cold 
War and the universal demise of international communism. But 
a historical and scientific approach may help us understand why 
the reformist currents symbolized by the Thirteenth Party Con-
gress would inevitably encounter insurmountable obstacles. 
Numerous works in the aftermath of the Tiananmen crisis 
reflect a new and warranted sense of realism. 20 Some provide 
illuminating details. Here I will only concentrate on the connec-
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tion between the problems unsolved in the Thirteenth Party Con-
gress and the Tiananmen crisis. 
Not long after the Thirteenth Party Congress, the reform coa-
lition ran into serious disarray. Beginning in mid 1988, Zhao's 
power over economic affairs was greatly curtailed. This was due 
to the serious inflation that was imputed to the reformists' una-
voidable yet unpopular price reform.Z 1 His attempt to gain 
inroads in the military was equally unsuccessful. As argued ear-
lier, economic reform was, and will continue to be, the most 
important national task in the PRC. Before the inflation crisis in 
1988, the main objective of Zhao and his proteges was to acceler-
ate the pace of economic reforms. Since Zhao's failure in insti-
tuting price controls, Li and Yao, thought to be more cautious 
and planning-oriented, took over economic affairs. To correct 
the problems of an over-heated economy, they instituted a series 
of austerity measures. Their primary goal was to slow down the 
pace: bringing in more control, reimposing many curbs, and 
averting a free-wheeling market economy. 22 
Nevertheless, it was those dramatic events in April-May 1989 
that culminated in Zhao's fall. Hu's untimely death in April trig-
gered a massive student demonstration, demanding freedom and 
democracy and the end of official corruption and inflation. The 
students' initial moderate requests were met by official refusal 
and stubbornness. A tough People's Daily editorial called the 
protest a "chaotic disturbance" and promised to "use troops 
when necessary."23 Tens of thousands of protesters marched 
through the police lines and surged into the Tiananmen Square to 
begin a month-long saga. The instant, powerful exposure pro-
vided by the flocking international press covering the Asian 
Development Bank meetings and the historic Sino-Soviet Summit 
and the lax political atmosphere surrounding these events 
emboldened the students. Clearly, compared to their senile lead-
ers, the students felt inspired by Gorbachev's perestroika and 
glasnost. Zhao exploited his public appearance with Gorbachev 
to reveal a "state secret" about the arrangement whereby Deng 
retained ultimate veto power over Politburo decisions. Deng was 
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suspicious about a conspiracy between Zhao and the students and 
decided to get tough with the latter. Then the fasting of 3,000 
hunger strikers, defying martial law, catalyzed the event and 
drew extensive support in China and the rest of the world. Zhao 
and his proteges (e.g., Hu Qili), siding with the students, lost the 
power struggle and were denounced by the hard-liners as an 
"anti-party clique," a phrase customarily used to stigmatize the 
losing side. 
After the bloody massacre on the night of June 3-4 that 
shocked millions of TV viewers, Zhao was stripped of all party 
and government posts. His fall also spelled political oblivion for 
his associates. Many of them either fled the country or were dis-
graced and jailed. Li Peng, with key support from Deng and 
other key leaders, apparently won the battle. However, a com-
promise figure, Jiang Zemin, the former party boss of Shanghai, 
was named successor to Zhao. Other beneficiaries of the purge 
included new Politburo members Song Ping, Minister of the 
State Planning Commission (a protege of Chen Yun), Li 
Ruihuan, ex-mayor of Tianjin, who was given the propaganda 
portfolio, and hardline Beijing Party Secretary Li Ximing. Gone 
were the "radical reformers;" China's entire political spectrum 
had indeed shifted to a more conservative direction. 
Internationally, the PRC was ostracized. Its relations with 
Washington entered a particularly difficult period, despite a nos-
talgic "China expert" sitting in the White House. The Iraqi inva-
sion of Kuwait provided a respite for the PRC's isolation. 
However, after the remarkable decommunization of the Eastern 
Bloc, the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the ending of 
the Cold War, the PRC appeared vulnerable and marginal. It 
now was the surviving heartland of the withering communist gos-
pel. Although it continues to play a key role in regional security 
affairs (e.g., the Korean and Indochinese peninsulas), its global 
strategic value as an anti-Soviet counterweight has become an 
anachronism. 
As Dittmer points out, a "partial reform crisis" at the system 
level is analogous to a succession crisis at the leadership level. 24 
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The situation becomes doubly complicated if these two crises 
coincide-as they did in 1989. As long as the current Chinese 
leadership continues to stress a more cautious economic reform 
without political liberalization and a personalized succession plan 
without institutionalized arrangements, a "partial reform syn-
drome" and "pre-mortem" struggle will continue to influence 
political developments in China. 
The Fourteenth Congress is set to convene in fall 1992. A 
personnel reshuffle and a final resolution of Zhao Ziyang's case 
are likely to be among the key items on the agenda. 25 Further-
more, a theoretical re-synthesis dealing with the pace and direc-
tion of the reforms and the status of socialism is needed to 
provide rationalization for China's future experiments. 
To be sure, since the Tiananmen crisis, China's economic 
reform and open-door policy have not been fundamentally 
reversed. However, they have surely been retrenched and reas-
sessed. How will the general trends of political and economic 
development affect Mainland-Taiwan relations? 
Factors Affecting Mainland-Taiwan Relations 
Assuming the current trends on the mainland of de-revolu-
tionalization, de-ideologization, and economic reform will be 
maintained, several factors will affect mainland-Taiwan relations 
and Taiwan's developments. The first is generational change. 
Despite the increased political influence of the senior leaders after 
the Tiananmen crisis, nature will soon compel these revolution-
ary veterans to pass on the mantle of leadership to a new cohort. 
These younger, better educated and more cosmopolitan second 
and third echelons have an agenda different from that of the 
older generation. Their priorities derive from the popular desire 
for modernization and improved quality of material and spiritual 
life rather than finishing the civil war. Reunification is not a mat-
ter demanding their constant attention. Hence, the sense of 
urgency for reunification among the people and the elites will 
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continue to fade. Compared to their predecessors, these new 
leaders may show greater appreciation of the complexities of the 
realities in Taiwan. 
A second factor is the extent of economic reform. Successes 
in urban reform and price reform, as well as the credibility of the 
state for respecting the private sector and the market mechanism, 
are all important in fostering the kind of "predictability" Max 
Weber believed to have contributed to capitalism. Taiwan's busi-
nesses certainly will watch China's developments along these 
lines. They will particularly observe the future developments of 
the special economic zones (SEZs) with caution and expectation. 
With caution because they will soon discover that the SEZs are 
replicas of their export-oriented labor-intensive factories. They 
will be squeezed out between mounting protectionism in the mar-
kets for their products in the industrialized nations (in particular, 
the U.S. and the unified Europe after 1993) and stiff competition 
from similar products from mainland SEZs produced by much 
cheaper labor. However, some more adventurous Taiwanese 
entrepreneurs will place their hope in the improvement of invest-
ment climate in the SEZs and the coastal areas. 26 
In fact, the linguistic affinity and the growing economic inter-
dependence between Taiwan and Fujian, between Hong Kong 
and Guangdong (Canton) and the perceived illegitimacy of 
nationalism centralized in Beijing (Peking) may intensify the 
South's centrifugal tendencies. As Edward Friedman eloquently 
foretells: 
Increasingly, the south, the future and the Chinese diaspora of 
Hong Kong, Macao, Taiwan, and Southeast Asia seem tied by 
trade and finance and travel and post-modern electronic 
media into a common promise of a better future, a new, 
broader, more open nationalism. The nineteenth century cen-
tralized tightly closed railroad regime of the north is ever 
more a foreign country ... The difference between ... north 
and south is experienced in China as a difference between the 
past and the future, between failure and promise, a modern 
age that never was and a post-modern era that could yet be. 27 
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The third factor is, of course, how and whether Beijing will 
honor its pledge to maintain Hong Kong's current systems 
unchanged for fifty years after the take-over. The reversion of 
Hong Kong to the PRC in 1997 seems to set a deadline for a 
change in Taipei's official "three-no" policy (no contact, no nego-
tiation, and no compromise), because by then Taiwan would be 
dealing with a special administrative region (SAR) under 
Peking's sovereignty.28 The ROC government has announced 
that it will not withdraw its offices from Hong Kong after 1997. 
In fact, as will be shown later, Taipei has recently adopted a 
more assertive policy toward the mainland. 29 
The events in Taiwan during this period sometimes con-
trasted with, yet at other times were influenced by, events on the 
mainland. We must now tum to recount the major developments 
in Taiwan. We start with the political agenda set forth by the 
late President Chiang Ching-kuo. · 
Chiang and Political Democratization in Taiwan 
The general image of the Nationalist government as one of 
"hard authoritarianism,"30 a nearly immutable image since the 
KMT moved to Taiwan in 1949, appears outdated in light of the 
series of landmark reforms implemented by Chiang in his final 
years. Some scholars marvel at the unique experience of a 
"quasi-Leninist" regime able to democratize itself in a top-down 
and peaceful manner.31 To be sure, there were some socio-eco-
nomic determinants of Taiwan's democratization.32 Neverthe-
less, Chiang was the indisputable catalyst for Taiwan's great 
stride toward democracy. However, his decision in 1986 to speed 
up reforms was prompted by some of his long-term perceptions 
of the reality in Taiwan and some immediate problems facing the 
regime at that time. The long-term impetus for both liberaliza-
tion and democratization came from his perception of the eco-
nomic, social, and political maturation of the Taiwan population 
and the increasing electoral appeal of the Tangwai. 
The most apparent immediate cause was the succession prob-
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lem. In failing health, Chiang knew that his constitutional suc-
cessor, Lee, would not likely replace him as the "lynchpin of 
cooperation between party conservatives and liberals and among 
party, state, army, and security officials."33 He may thus have 
felt that difficult but necessary reforms should be undertaken 
before he passed from the scene rather than be left for his less-
equipped successor to handle. Moreover, reform could contrib-
ute to a smoother transition by increasing the legitimacy of the 
regime, reducing the motivation for the population to become 
involved in political disorders, and setting in place improved 
mechanisms for long-term recruitment of new leaders at all 
levels. 
Additional concerns motivating the reform were a series of 
internal and foreign shocks in 1985-1986. The first was the reve-
lation that the 1984 assassination of the U.S. businessman and 
writer Henry Liu had been carried out at the behest of the head 
of the Defence Ministry's Intelligence Bureau. 34 The second was 
the bankruptcy of Taipei's Tenth Credit Cooperative due to mis-
management by officials with ties to KMT politicians. The third 
was the forced negotiation by officials of the state-owned China 
Airlines with PRC airline representatives over the return of a 
cargo plane hijacked by its pilot to Canton. Taipei's decision to 
enter talks practically broke the "three-no" policy despite the 
civilian and technical disguise of the negotiation. 
Such incidents persuaded Chiang of the need to revitalize the 
ruling party and government. On the international scene, in 
addition, political reform offered the possibility of enhancing the 
image of a regime that had been especially vulnerable to foreign 
opinion (the U.S. in particular) due to its trade dependence and 
diplomatic isolation. Furthermore, the initiation of bold reform 
steps in 1986 offered the possibility of strengthening the KMT's 
appeal in the upcoming election on 6 December. 
As Huntington's observation mentioned earlier demonstrates, 
the reformer is in a precarious position: he must maintain a con-
centrated hold on power in order to be able to disperse it, and 
must implement reform measures quickly enough to prevent the 
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consolidation of conservative opposition, but not so quickly as to 
allow the pace of events to get out of control. That is why "revo-
lutions are rare, but reforms are even more rare."35 Among these 
rare reforms, Taiwan's reform is one of the very rare successes. 
To be sure, the challenges normally facing a reformer indeed 
challenged Chiang in 1986. 
Preludes to the Thirteenth Party Congress 
The question was how to turn a personal decision for reform 
into a party program. Chiang used a mixed strategy of persua-
sion, Machiavellian maneuvers, and public relations. After enun-
ciating that the time had come for a constitutional democracy at 
the Third Plenum of the KMT's Twelfth Central Committee in 
March 1986, he appointed a twelve-man task force of Standing 
Committee members to study a six-point reform proposal. These 
issues pertained to (I) the strengthening of the central legislative 
bodies (by conducting a large-scale supplementary election), 
(2) the legal aspects of local self-government, (3) a national 
security law, (4) the organization of voluntary associations, 
(5) the improvement of social orders, and (6) the strengthening 
of party work. 36 
On the eve of the Thirteenth Party Congress, concrete pro-
posals for (1) and (2) were completed, despite DPP leaders' dis-
satisfaction. (3) was passed before the lifting of martial law in 
July 1987, and had been in force since then. (4) was long a point 
of contention between the KMT and the DPP in the legislature, 
primarily due to the KMT's insistence that new political bodies 
be anti-communist, endorsing the 1947 constitution, and non-
separatist-a scheme to forestall the DPP's independence aspira-
tion. Yet, the KMT made concessions on the procedures on the 
formation of parties (automatic approval). The DPP and all 
other political parties that "notified" the Ministry of Interior 
Affairs had all become legal. 37 
The net results of these reforms have generally been positive. 
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A sense of political consciousness and efficacy were unleashed in 
the post-Chiang era. "Street demonstrations," "self-help rem-
edy," "revelations" became everyday political activities. The 
general public responded to the KMT's reforms with more 
demands. Many long-time political taboos became subjects of 
after-tea talks. News media began to enjoy a greater scope of 
freedom because readers wanted to move ahead. The overall 
atmosphere was optimistic, confident, and imaginative. 
Externally, the regime also began to display greater flexibility. 
In April 1988, after a two-year absence, the ROC returned to the 
annual conference of the Asian Development Bank (ADB) under 
the protested name "Taipei, China."38 This set a precedent for 
the coexistence of Taipei and Beijing in intergovernmental orga-
nizations, their formal names notwithstanding. 39 Another exam-
ple of this upbeat mood was the decision in late 1987 to allow 
Taiwan citizens to visit their relatives on the mainland. This act 
gave Taipei a propaganda bonanza. It was also a politically wise 
move: increased human exchanges reassured Taiwan citizens' 
confidence in their own system, created a momentum of its own 
for expanded contacts between Taiwan and the mainland, and 
dealt a blow to the Taiwan Independence groups. A third exam-
ple was Taiwan's prompt delivery, in May 1988, of the crew, pas-
sengers, and plane of a PRC plane hijacked to Taiwan and the 
wise decision to handle the two hijackers according to interna-
tional customary laws.40 A further relaxation of relations with 
the mainland seemed almost certain. Indeed, among the five 
major proposals discussed at the KMT's Thirteenth National 
Congress, the "mainland policy" proposal was the one that inter-
ested many Taiwan citizens and Western observers. 
To show its keen appreciation of the prevailing trend of 
democratization, the KMT also did several things in a new style, 
such as the practice of electing (rather than appointing) most of 
its delegates to the congress. The party congress was expected to 
represent a culmination of the reform measures under way. 
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The KMT's Thirteenth National Congress: Achievements and 
Challenges 
The KMT's Thirteenth National Congress sought to achieve 
a difficult two-fold task: promoting reform while placating con-
servatives. An element of compromise was thus seen throughout 
the congress, mainly because Lee was still striving to consolidate 
his own power and lacked the imperial mystique of his predeces-
sor. Hence, the congress did not totally satisfy anyone, yet it also 
allowed each group to claim victory in various areas. 
In many ways, the KMT's Thirteenth National Congress was 
strikingly similar to the CCP's Thirteenth National Congress 
held a year earlier. Both me_etings represented a changing of the 
guard and a reinterpretation of ideologies to meet real-world 
demands. 
Personnel Rejuvenation 
On the personnel dimension, as mentioned earlier, in the 
PRC the congress marked the retirement of most veterans of the 
Long March (1934-35), participation in which had long been a 
required credential for senior leaders. In Taiwan, the congress, 
as one analyst stated, marked the retirement of many of Taiwan's 
"Long Marchers": those wealthy and powerful mainlanders who 
fled to Taiwan in 1949 with Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek.41 
In the PRC, Zhao, 69, a reform-minded technocrat who was not 
on the Long March, was confirmed as party general secretary. In 
Taiwan, Lee, 65, a reform-minded technocrat and native son of 
Taiwan, was confirmed as party chairman. Furthermore, the 
paramount Deng in the PRC intended to use the congress to 
solidify reforms. In Taiwan, the late Chiang had left behind a 
mandate to transform Taiwan into a democracy. The details 
were left to Lee. 
There were several characteristics of other personnel arrange-
ments: (1) rejuvenization (nien-ch 'ing-hua), (2) professionaliza-
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tion (chuan-yeh-hua), (3) pluralization (tuo-yuan-hua), and 
(4) democratization (min-chu-hua). First, the members of both 
the Central Committee (CC) and the Central Standing Commit-
tee (CSC) were much younger, their average ages dropped from 
seventy to fifty-nine and seventy to sixty-three respectively.42 
Second, some important young generalists-technocrats joined the 
cc and the esc and became cabinet members in the subsequent 
cabinet reshuffie.43 Third, both the CC and the CSC incorpo-
rated a wider spectrum of leaders, although the proportion of 
popularly elected legislators at various levels remained low. 
Moreover, native Taiwanese had since made up 45 percent of the 
CC and 51 percent of the CSC.44 Fourth, competition of the CC 
election was unprecedented. As many as thirty-three chairman-
nominated CC candidates lost to self-proclaimed contestants. 
The ranking of the CC members elected contrasted sharply with 
the chairman's ranking. 
Policies and Doctrines 
On the policy dimension, the KMT's congress also resembled 
the CCP's in its attempt to reinterpret its official ideology. The 
KMT had long claimed to be the follower of Dr. Sun Yat-sen's 
"Three Principles of the People"-nationalism, democracy, and 
people's livelihood. Since the KMT moved to Taiwan, national-
ism had been reinterpreted to mean the recovery of China from 
the communists. Under plans laid by Lee, the party congress was 
slated to shift these priorities around. Democracy was moved to 
the forefront;45 nationalism was reinterpreted to mean that the 
KMT must set a democratic example for the PRC to follow. 
This shifting in priorities confirms this paper's argument that 
democratization will be Taiwan's foremost task in the near 
future. 
There were five major proposals in the congress. In addition 
to the "ideology and thought" proposal mentioned above, the 
other four were: "amendment of the party constitution," 
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"reform of party work," "platforms and policies," and "main-
land policy."46 Among them the most crucial task was the 
restructuring of the party. The proposed change would reorgan-
ize the KMT more or less along the lines of the Japanese Liberal 
Democratic Party. The new party structure would consist of 
three branches: policy coordination, organization and mobiliza-
tion, and administration and management. The immediate major 
aim of this reorganization, according to Lee Huan, the KMT's 
secretary-general, was to win the supplementary (legislators) and 
local elections in late 1989.47 
The "platforms and policies" proposal was criticized as being 
too vague and lacking concrete measures for executing these 
political pronouncements. 
The "mainland policy" reflected an incrementalist response 
to the new situation between Taiwan and the mainland. It urged 
limited further relaxation of human, commercial, and cultural 
interchanges between the mainland and Taiwan. It was generally 
believed that future policies toward the mainland would amount 
to continued ex post facto legalization of the multitude of fait 
accompli between the two sides. However, it gradually became 
clear that Taipei was increasingly concerned about receiving 
reciprocal signals from Beijing showing its sincerity following 
each "concession" made by Taipei (i.e., relaxation of control on 
contacts with the mainland).48 
Overall, the general trends favor the reformists. As time 
passes, Lee will gradually nurture his own prestige and credibil-
ity. However, some uncertainties obscure Taiwan's future. 
Unsolved Problems 
The KMT's Thirteenth National Congress could not solve 
some of the most difficult problems that later dictated the ROC's 
political development. The first was the pace of the reforms. The 
ruling and reality-bound KMT was commonly perceived by the 
oppositionist and idealistic DPP as sluggish and half-hearted in 
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pushing forward the reforms the DPP had long been demanding. 
For example, on the issue of rejuvenating the national legisla-
tures, the KMT favored an incremental approach: a combina-
tion of supplementary elections for those legislators that 
represent Taiwan constituencies and an honorable (and "volun-
tary") retirement scheme for those that have not faced reelection 
for the past forty years. Yet the DPP demands a total replace-
ment of these old guards by Taiwan politicians.49 Confrontations 
such as this had been carried to the streets from the legislatures. 
The second is a growing polarization between the KMT posi-
tions and DPP positions on the debate on independence versus 
reunification (t'ung tu chi cheng), a twisted simplification of the 
discussion of Taiwan's future and mainland-Taiwan relations. 
The sentence of Ts'ai Y ou-chiian and Hsu Ts'ao-teh for "dissem-
inating ideas of Taiwan independence" failed to put a lid on this 
burning issue. The tragic self-incineration of Cheng Nan-jung, a 
radical non-DPP mainlander advocate of Taiwan Independence, 
further dramatized this issue. The DPP challenged discrepancies 
between KMT's rhetoric (reunification) and behavior (indepen-
dence).50 As later events showed, this controversy revived the 
specter of sub-ethnic conflict (sheng-chi wen-t'i) and caused great 
confusion with respect to national identity. It seems that for the 
foreseeable future, the only tacit consensus for these two most 
important political groups would be limited to Taiwan's further 
democratization. 
Constitutional Engineering and the National Affairs 
Conference 
Many of these problems had collectively and cumulatively 
elevated the political crisis to a constitutional crisis. It appeared 
necessary for the major political actors in Taiwan to negotiate a 
new "pact"51 that possessed a constitutional status, because the 
constituencies and political environment associated with the 1947 
constitution had fundamentally changed, notwithstanding the 
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fact that that constitution had never been faithfully enforced due 
to the layers of extraordinary measures placed upon it over the 
last four decades. This new consensus-building is an important 
ingredient in any further meaningful movement toward democra-
tization. In fact, political development in Taiwan since the 
KMT's Thirteenth National Congress had been dominated by 
this challenge. In particular, an unusual National Affairs Con-
ference (NAC)52 was held to hear all major social groups' opin-
ions. Afterwards, Lee Teng-hui tried, with toil and frustration, 
to lead the KMT to implement the limited conclusions reached in 
the NAC. 
Preludes to the NAC: Constitutional Crisis and Student 
Demonstrations 
As Lee was seeking reelection in early 1990 after having 
served the unfinished term of Chiang, he faced a concerted chal-
lenge from within the KMT. A chasm between an "anti-main-
stream faction" (jei chu-liu p'az) and a "mainstream faction" 
(chu-liu p'ai) developed along the fault line of sub-ethnicity.53 
And this split, caused by a sheer power struggle, spilled into the 
society-at-large and reopened a politically sensitive wound. The 
"anti-mainstream faction" put forth a counterticket consisting of 
Lin Yang-kang and Chiang Wei-kuo, the surviving son of Chiang 
Kai-shek. The Lin-Chiang candidacy was viable only because 
the president is not popularly elected, but is chosen by the 
National Assembly, which, until then, was still controlled by eld-
erly mainlanders last elected in 194 7. It was increasingly clear 
that the National Assembly was going to engage in a game of 
political blackmail, embarrassing the KMT and infuriating the 
general public. 
In March, an estimated 10,000 students staged a sit-in, 
demanding the dissolution of the National Assembly, the aboli-
tion of the Temporary Provisions (which greatly restricted many 
constitutional freedoms because of the "communist rebellion on 
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the mainland"), a timetable on Taiwan's political restructuring, 
and a national meeting to discuss Taiwan's political future. In 
contrast to the CCP leaders, Lee met with the students and 
agreed to hold a national meeting during the summer that would 
consider their requests. However, there is a similarity between 
Taipei's 1990 and Beijing's 1989 student protests. The students 
(and the intellectuals in general), who in China traditionally had 
a sense of mission and often served the rulers, had once again 
become involved in a leadership power struggle, except that Lee 
seemed bolstered, and Zhao weakened, by the students' support. 
On 21 March, Lee was elected president. In his inaugural 
speech in May, he announced that he would revoke the Tempo-
rary Provisions within a year, and he reassured the conservatives 
that he would strive for peaceful reunification of China. The 
abrogation of the Temporary Provisions implied ending the state 
of war that had existed with the PRC. It also involved the 
amendment and modification of hundreds of laws that derived 
from the provisions. This was a daunting task, given the fist-fight 
culture existing in the Legislative Yuan. 
Lee and key KMT officials sensed that the octogenarian par-
liamentarians would become a major electoral liability, as 
demonstrated in KMT's "defeat" in the 1989 elections.54 A 
"voluntary" honorary retirement scheme for these elders encoun-
tered great resistance, particularly from the National Assembly 
delegates, who knew too well that it was they that would elect the 
president. Finally, a "judicial" solution, which was wise and fun-
damental, was found to solve this political problem. 55 In June, 
the Council of Grand Justices, which thirty-nine years earlier 
ruled in favor of the "everlasting delegates," ruled that all dele-
gates elected by mainland constituencies or according to the 
Temporary Provision's "supplementary elections" arrangement 
in Taiwan would have to retire by 31 December 1991. This his-
toric constitutional interpretation (No. 261) finally ended the 
"Everlasting Parliament." The stage was set for faster and 
deeper political reform. 
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The National Affairs Conference: Reassembling Consensus? 
Can it be Done? 
The NAC was attended by 150 representatives from across 
the entire political spectrum. 56 Five major issues dominated the 
agenda: (1) reform of the central legislatures, (2) local govern-
ment, (3) structure of the central government, (4) revision of the 
ROC Constitution (including the Temporary Provisions), and 
(5) policy toward the Mainland.57 
Given the composition of the participants and the nature of 
the meeting, 58 several predictable results can be summarized. 
First, the NAC symbolized a period of political relaxation. 
Many overseas dissidents were invited. The key leaders of the 
KMT and the DPP seemed to develop a "working relationship." 
The meeting was characterized by lively debate. Second, it was 
increasingly clear that the NAC was degenerating into a two-
party affair, with scholars and third parties playing marginal 
roles. The DPP seemed to be willing to become a "vested inter-
est," sharing important political resources with the KMT. 59 
Third, the NAC failed to reach consensus on most issues. 
Although the mainstream forces of the KMT (the "mainstream 
faction") and the DPP (the moderate Formosa clique, mei-li-tao 
hsi) seemed to have developed between them a kind of "camara-
derie," they still had to seek support from the vocal opponents 
within their parties: the conservative "anti-mainstream faction" 
of the KMT, and the radical New Tide clique (hsin-ch'ao-liu hst) 
of the DPP. 
The areas of agreement were limited: (1) retirement of all 
senior parliamentarians,60 (2) symbolic representation by 
"nationwide" and overseas delegates in the legislatures,61 
(3) abrogation of the Temporary Provisions,62 (4) direct, popu-
lar election of the governor of Taiwan and of the mayors of 
Taipei and Kaohsiung,63 and (5) an incremental and functional 
approach for mainland-Taiwan relations. 
The controversies, however, were more fundamental. First, 
the KMT insisted on a "partial revision" of the 1947 constitu-
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tion, whereas the DPP promoted a new constitution. The KMT 
hoped to reduce social costs and preserve the original constitu-
tion as much as possible. Its strategy was a two-staged constitu-
tional revision. The first stage, "procedural revision," would 
enact a Supplementary Provisions (tseng-hsiu t'iao-wen) to 
replace the Temporary Provisions and serve as a "bridge" to the 
second-stage "substantive revision" of the constitution by the 
Second National Assembly delegates to be elected in December 
1991.64 The DPP's proposed constitution calls for direct, popu-
lar election of the president, who would command enormous 
powers. A popularly elected president with real powers would be 
an important part of "self-determination." 
Second, although both parties agreed that the next president 
would be chosen through direct, popular elections, they differed 
on how such "direct and popular" votes should be carried out. 
The DPP insisted that the president be elected by all eligible citi-
zens. The KMT, during the campaigns of the 1991 National 
Assembly election, instructed its candidates to sell the idea of 
"delegated direct vote" (wei-jen chi-hsiian), which would func-
tion much like the U.S. electoral college system. This system 
would preserve the constitution and symbolically maintain a con-
stituency representing all China (because some of the "electors" 
would be "nationwide" or "overseas" delegates").65 
Third, on the structure of the central government, the DPP 
clearly favored a presidential system. The KMT initially hoped 
to retain an essentially "five-power system"66 by partially revis-
ing the 194 7 constitution. However, as seen in recent drafts of 
the revisions, 67 it is increasingly less clear how such a system can 
be retained. 
No doubt, the Fourteenth Party Congress, which is scheduled 
to convene in spring-summer 1993,68 will be empowered to tackle 
some of these issues and initiate another round of personnel 
reshuffling. 
Apparently, Taiwan had entered another period of political 
uncertainty. One of the major problems is the deteriorated qual-
ity of political culture in the legislatures. The earlier euphoria of 
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many analysts rested on the assumption that the retirement of 
the "everlasting delegates" would contribute to a more demo-
cratic and effective legislature. However, the superficial self-
aggrandizement and brazen power-hunger displayed by these leg-
islators duly elected by Taiwan's voters promise more trouble 
ahead. 
Nevertheless, there are still reasons for hope. Despite occa-
sional setbacks, Taiwan's democratization has progressed 
through a critical point. Such a development seems almost 
impossible to reverse. Hopefully, with the distribution of polit-
ical resources eventually completed, and the elites and populace 
gaining more political maturity, Taiwan may indeed become a 
stable and respectable democracy. Moreover, with the increased 
contact with the mainland, Taiwan can be expected to exert more 
influence on future developments in the PRC. It is on this pros-
pect that we now tum to. 
Prospects for Taiwan-Mainland Interactions 
Clearly, developments in Taiwan will have a tremendous 
impact on developments in the mainland and on the evolution of 
mainland-Taiwan relations. First, the Taiwan leadership is 
undergoing not only a generational, but ethnic change. For the 
first time, a native son of Taiwan is the boss and wields real 
power. The younger leaders, brought into the political spotlight 
under Chiang's policies of "Taiwanization" (t'ai-wan hua) and 
"indigenization" (pen-t'u hua ), are more cosmopolitan in their 
world view than their predecessors and are less likely to maintain 
the same sort of political system or adherence to the myth of 
being the government of all China. While lacking their elders' 
sentimental attachment to the mainland and their relatives there, 
they also lack their direct fear and mistrust of the CCP and their 
unwillingness to pursue contacts. Yet, translating this pragmatic 
attitude toward the mainland into a willingness to negotiate 
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terms of reunification with the mainland requires a leap of faith 
unjustified by the evidence presently available. 
In fact, as argued earlier, most key leaders in Taiwan now 
favor an incremental and functional approach toward the main-
land. They hope to carefully engage the PRC in a peaceful envi-
ronment by gradually providing economic incentives. 
Compared to previous policies toward the PRC, which were 
dogmatic and defensive, the ROC had completed an organiza-
tional chain in charge of mainland affairs, with the National 
Reunification Commission (NRC) under the president's office 
making high-level policies, the Mainland Affairs Commission 
(MAC) under the cabinet carrying out these policies, and a semi-
official Strait Exchange Foundation (SEF) doing the actual nego-
tiations with PRC authorities on such matters as fishing disputes, 
cooperation on crime prevention, notarization of documents, etc. 
for the government. And the scope of such functional and "unof-
ficial" matters keeps expanding. Increasingly, regular contacts 
and working relationships had developed between the SEF and 
its mainland counterparts in many functional areas. This must 
be seen as a positive trend. 
Furthermore, in early 1991, the Guidelines for National 
Reunification thoughtfully spelled out the concrete goals for each 
successive stage in a long process of Taiwan-mainland rapproche-
ment leading to national reunification. 69 
Taiwan's growing confidence toward the PRC is also part of a 
new outward assertiveness that employed practical and uncon-
ventional conducts of external relations. 70 
A second factor is Taiwan's democratization itself. Taiwan's 
experience has reflected the emergence of a highly educated and 
affluent middle class no longer satisfied with political nonpartici-
pation. New actors join the pluralizing political scene. The 
political authorities are held more accountable, responsive, and 
responsible. This means that Taiwan's democratization will 
inspire the incipient democratization movement in the main-
land.71 Moreover, this political pluralism symbolizes that any 
negotiated solution by the KMT and the CCP alone on future 
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mainland-Taiwan relations will no longer be a possibility. The 
increasingly complicated situation requires Beijing to replace its 
one-sided and domineering position with an accommodative, 
business-like stance based on sensitivity to and current knowl-
edge of Taiwan's reality. 
Third, Taiwan's increasing international diplomatic isolation 
(largely due to Beijing's pressure) may generate among the lead-
ers and the people resentment about Beijing's intentions and mis-
trust in its offers. On the other hand, it might also compel a 
desperate Taipei to succumb to Beijing's reunification scheme. 
But the possibility of this latter scenario should not be exagger-
ated, since Taiwan has for years been conducting its "substantive 
diplomacy" (virtually all ties except diplomatic ones) with most 
countries in the world. More likely it will force Taiwan to take a 
more explicit independent posture. 
Finally, Taiwan's economy is confronted with the need for 
upgrading its industrial structure and diversifying its export mar-
kets, for it is faced with reduced competitiveness (in such sectors 
as textiles and low-technology electronics), and increasing pro-
tectionism in the U.S. and other markets. In the near future, 
however, the existence of a China market for goods and services, 
for raw materials and low-cost labor, as well as capital invest-
ment opportunities present an almost irresistible lure to some 
Taiwanese businessmen and will probably solve a number of 
problems faced by the Taiwan economy. 
Interdependence, Competition, and Learning 
Comparing recent developments in the mainland and Taiwan 
reveals an interdependence between their systems: the endoge-
nous changes on one side form some exogenous stimuli to the 
endogenous changes on the other side; and changes on either side 
affect the interactions between the two sides. Developments in 
the mainland and Taiwan should not be regarded as isolated phe-
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nomena; in fact they occur in a larger ecology that link the two 
sides. 
This growing interconnectedness is facilitated by a number of 
factors. The first is a shared developmental orientation toward 
domestic agenda at the present time. The mainland's orientation 
toward economic reform will improve the material welfare of the 
populace and enhance its appeal to the outside world, including 
Taiwan. Taiwan's orientation toward political democratization 
will help strengthen the regime's ultimate legitimacy and provide 
a role model and a source of hope for the Chinese people's peren· 
nial quest for democracy. Both leaderships' resort to rationality 
and their need to safeguard the domestic scene can contribute to 
a more relaxed and tolerant atmosphere between the two. 
Secondly, concrete contacts between the two sides have been 
steadily developing, although they are still not fully regulated 
and, hence, are risky. The discussion on the future political rela· 
tionship between the mainland and Taiwan should not be teleo· 
logically predetermined (i.e., reunification simply for the sake of 
reunification) as to violate the natural evolution of mainland· Tai· 
wan relations. From a positive angle, the eventual resolution of 
the political arrangement between the mainland and Taiwan 
should involve a sequence of processes. 
The first process is reduction of hostility: the emergence of 
pragmatic young leaders free of historical burdens, the general 
orientation toward domestic priorities on both sides, and the 
courage to take bold initiatives to cope with a new situation are 
all conditions which will contribute to that goal. 
The second process is reconciliation and trust/confidence 
building: the increased contacts between the two will require the 
two to foster a stabilized relationship between them. Accumula-
tion of good experiences from a pile of low-level, people-to-peo-
ple, technical, "peripheral" contacts provides the confidence and 
trust that can pave the way for higher-level, public, "core," polit-
ical contacts. 
The third process is resolution of differences. This does not 
mean that these two systems should be homogenized, in fact they 
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may never be. What this means is that each system develops 
closer to the other: to develop values and institutions that 
accommodate their differences. Increased contacts create a 
momentum of their own and may exceed a critical mass as to 
generate qualitative changes. "The Guidelines for National 
Reunification" largely captured this need for incremental and 
sequential development. 
Both systems are in the transition to a "softer" and more 
"functional" variant of polity that makes mutual accommodation 
more possible. 
Taiwan is described as changing itself from "hard authoritari-
anism" to "soft authoritarianism,"72 or even to a rudimentary 
democracy. The state-society relationship is relative, since a 
highly differentiated, privatized society checks the power of the 
political center. And its political center relies on incremental 
adjustments to achieve its goals. 
On the contrary, the PRC used to be pictured as a "totalitar-
ian" or "totalistic" polity. 73 Its state-society relationship used to 
be absolute, and its political center used to rely on dramatic 
transformations to achieve its goal. Now with the privatized 
incentive system, the state refrains from total interference in vari-
ous sectors in the society. Further, there is an urge for genuine 
implementation of constitutional protection of citizen's freedoms 
and rights. The changing Chinese system defies existing nomen-
clatures in most instances. Yet the overall trend is toward, not 
away from, Taiwan's direction. 
These shifts may indicate the elites' realization that there are 
circumstances in which relatively democratic institutions are 
more functional for them than authoritarian ones. 74 The new 
rationality in politics each side obtains will facilitate the solution 
of each side's own problems and ease contacts with the other 
side. 
The current situation between the mainland and Taiwan can 
best be termed as a "competitive learning process." But this is a 
new game: yesterday's competition based on ideological confron-
tation, conflicting legal claims, and political power has changed 
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into a new competition based on policies and systems. This com-
petition is interactive, benignant, and progressive. Hopefully it 
will help Chinese on both sides of the Taiwan Strait to search for 
a genuinely suitable system. 
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